Language in self-observation more

In  J.  Clegg  (ed.),  Self  Observation  in  the  Human  Sciences.    Charlotte,  N.C.:   Transaction  Publishers.                 Language  in  Self-­observation     Brady  Wagoner     Aalborg  University,  Denmark         The  issue  of  language  is  at  the  heart  of  self-­‐observation.    In  order  for  an   experience   to   become   scientific   data   it   has   to   be   expressed   in   a   communicable   form.   As   with   all   language   use,   we   must   presuppose   a   social   practice,   in   which   expressions   can   be   made   sense   of   and   evaluated   by   others   (Wittgenstein,   1953).     The   practice   of   social   observation   developed   out   of   the   protestant   cultural   tradition,   whereby   one   engaged   in   private   self-­‐scrutiny   and   self-­‐examination.     When   this   tradition   transformed   into   scientific   practice   new   languages,   social   relationships   and   roles   were   simultaneously   developed,   which   in   some   ways   displaced  and  in  other  ways  extended  the  existing  traditions  of  self-­‐observation.     In  either  religious  or  scientific  self-­‐observation,  knowledge  of  one’s  own  mind  is   inseparably  intertwined  with  the  institutions  in  which  the  activity  is  performed.     As   language   is   an   essential   feature   of   institutional   life,   it   is   little   surprise   that   the   early   debates   between   psychological   laboratories   about   self-­‐observation   often   revolved  around  issues  of  language,  description  and  expression.   The   fact   that   language   is   intimately   related   to   the   practice   of   self-­‐ observation   poses   a   major   challenge   for   developing   adequate   methodologies,   which   I   will   argue   the   early   introspectionists   were   not   fully   aware   of.   They   were   guided   largely   by   a   dualistic   assumption   that   the   mind   is   inherently   individual   and   private.   Beginning   with   this   assumption,   however,   one   wonders   how   anything  can  be  communicated  about  inner  experience  at  all!  If  self-­‐observation   is   intimately   linked   to   social   practices   and   social   institutions,   we   cannot   legitimately   claim   that   it   is   a   purely   individual   process,   but   must   instead   explore   it  in  its  social  dimensions.    In  contrast  to  dualism,  I  will  adopt  the  functionalist   perspective   of   the   American   pragmatists   and   argue   that   the   act   of   self-­‐ observation   is   essentially   a   social   process.   This   will   be   true   of   both   its   inner-­‐ directed   observation   phase   and   outer-­‐directed   communication   phase.     Furthermore,   we   will   see   that   the   two   phases   need   to   be   considered   together,   as   a   cycle,   if   we   are   to   understand   the   data   of   self-­‐observation.   Rather   than   condemning   self-­‐observation   as   a   method   bound   to   failure,   I   argue   that   these   dynamics   open   up   novel   avenues   for   pursuing   it,   which   I   will   illustrate   with   a   study  of  process-­‐oriented  rating  scales.       The  present  chapter  is  divided  into  three  parts:  First,  a  brief  history  of  the   early   laboratories   using   self-­‐observation   is   given,   focusing   on   how   various   linguistic   practices   and   social   relationships   among   experimenter   and   observer   shaped   their   results.   Second,   I   outline   an   argument   for   studying   mind   as   it   becomes  embodied  in  a  public  material  medium  and  the  influence  of  others  and   social  institutions  on  the  operation  and  observation  of  mind.    Finally,  I  will  use   ideas  developed  here  to  critique  and  redevelop  contemporary  psychology’s  most   widely  used  and  perhaps  (willfully)  least  understood  method  of  self-­‐observation,   rating   scales.   The   act   of   rating   will   be   shown   to   involve   a   dialogical   process   of   linguistic   sense   making,   and   as   such   the   idea   that   rating   scales   provide   unitary   access   to   some   inherently   quantifiable   mental   state   will   have   to   be   abandoned.     Instead,   rating   scales   can   be   used   as   tools   to   explore   the   context   sensitive   dynamics  of  research  participants’  meaning  making.       Varieties  of  Laboratory  Language     There   are   many   varieties   of   ‘self-­‐observation’,   even   among   the   early   laboratories  of  psychology.    Using  a  single  label  for  them  all  should  not  blind  us   to   their   diversity.     The   languages   used   by   different   laboratories   reflected,   or   perhaps  constructed,  these  differences  in  research  practice.    In  this  section,  I  will   briefly   compare   some   of   the   early   psychological   laboratories,   concentrating   on   how   their   language   use   and   the   practice   of   self-­‐observation   interrelate.   Thus,   I   will  not  attempt  to  tell  a  full  narrative  history,  but  rather  focus  on  core  themes   emerging   around   the   issue   of   language.   Although   self-­‐observation   has   a   long   history,  it  will  for  our  purposes  be  convenient  to  begin  with  Wundt,  because  he   initiated   a   new   phase   of   research   practice   and   set   up   the   restrictions   on   self-­‐ observation,  which  others  would  feel  compelled  to  transgress.         Wundt  and  why  simple  judgments  are  not  so  simple     Wundt   sharply   distinguished   his   method   of   ‘internal   perception’   (innere   Wahrnehmung)   from   the   traditional   notion   of   ‘self-­‐observation’   (Selbstbeobachtung).  This  was  not  mere  semantics.    It  expressed  his  acceptance   of   arguments   by   earlier   thinkers   against   self-­‐observation   as   a   viable   scientific   method   and   his   strategy   for   overcoming   the   problematic.     Firstly,   it   had   been   argued  that  scientific  method  required  the  subject  and  object  of  observation  be   independent   from   one   another,   which   was   not   the   case   in   traditional   self-­‐ observation.   Second,   mental   events   were   not   reported   directly   but   rather   ‘retrospectively’  and  thus  the  data  was  distorted  by  memory.       Wundt’s   solution   to   these   problems   was   to   only   accept   the   data   of   self-­‐ observation  when  firstly,  there  was  a  controllable  external  stimulus  that  could  be   varied   at   will   to   produce   different   experiential   effects,   and   secondly,   observers   reported   their   experience   immediately   so   as   minimize   distortions   of   memory.     These  conditions  could  only  be  achieved  in  an  experimental  laboratory.    A  third   major   restriction,   following   from   the   other   two,   was   on   the   observer’s   use   of   language.   Danziger   (1980,   p.   247)   comments,   “the   introspective   reports   (in   Wundt’s   laboratory)   were   largely   limited   to   judgments   of   size,   intensity,   and   duration   of   physical   stimuli,   supplemented   at   times   by   judgments   of   their   simultaneity  and  succession”.  In  other  words,  it  was  not  the  sensations  as  such   that   were   described   but   rather   judgments   were   made   about   their   attributes   (Boring,  1950).     For  instance,  to  test  different  sensory  thresholds  Wundt  used  the  varied   the   distance   of   two   separate   points   on   the   skin   (a   method   first   used   by   physiologist   Ernst   Weber).   Observers   were   to   report   simply   whether   they   experienced   two   or   one   points   of   stimulation.   However,   even   with   this   relatively   straightforward   method   problems   crept   in.   In   a   study   done   by   Binet   (1903)   in   Paris,   instead   of   asking   of   judgments   of   one   OR   two-­‐points,   he   had   observers   report  the  sensation  qualitatively.    In  so  doing,  he  found  an  array  of  intermediate   qualities  such  as  a  broad  heavy  point  or  bell  shaped  point.    Were  these  to  count   as   one   or   two-­‐points?     That   depended   on   observers’   interpretation   of   the   task   and  the  meaning  of  one  or  two  points  within  a  social  practice.       The   Cambridge   expedition   to   the   Torres   Straight   ran   into   the   same   problem   in   using   the   two-­‐point   test   to   see   whether   the   sensory   thresholds   of   natives   were   greater   than   Europeans.   The   trouble   was   it   is   unclear   that   the   people  on  the  Torres  Straight  interpreted  the  task  in  the  same  way  as  Europeans.     In   fact,   it   is   entirely   likely   that   they   saw   it   as   a   competitive   social   practice   and   as   such   they   were   more   willing   to   interpret   a   sensation   as   two-­‐points   than   they   might  otherwise  be;  little  did  they  know  winning  here  really  meant  losing,  in  that   it  confirmed  western  prejudices  about  natives  as  having  superior  senses  and  as  a   result  a  weaker  intellect,  given  the  then  widespread  assumption  that  there  was  a   zero-­‐sum  relation  between  the  two  (see  Richards,  1998)   It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  question  of  intermediate  forms  between   one   and   two   points   does   not   arise   from   inside   Wundt’s   laboratory,   but   rather   from   an   outsider,   i.e.   Binet.   Wundt’s   theory   stated   that   the   qualitative   wholes   identified   by   Binet   could   be   broken   down   into   more   elementary   sensations,   which   would   then   decide   the   matter   between   one   or   two   points   once   and   for   all.   Observers   in   Wundt’s   laboratory   were   taught   to   automatically   decompose   wholes   into   their   elementary   sensations.   To   qualify   as   an   observer   in   Wundt’s   laboratory   one   had   to   have   made   ten   thousand   introspective   judgments,   so   as   to   make   judgments   more   immediately   and   thus   minimize   the   distorting   effect   of   thought   and   memory.   Thus,   observers   were   acculturated   to   the   particular   standards   of   correctedness   of   the   Leipzig   laboratory.   This   clearly   also   had   the   effect  of  forming  the  data  produced  in  self-­‐observation  towards  that  laboratory’s   conventions.   In   sum,   even   at   this   fairly   basic   level   of   sensory   stimulation,   we   see   that  the  language  of  observation  is  closely  linked  to  what  is  observed.  What  one   experiences   is   interrelated   with   what   one   is   attending   to—a   fact   actually   established  early  on  in  the  introspection  debate.     The  Würzburg  School  and  the  virtues  and  vices  of  vague  vocabulary     It   wasn’t   long   before   Wundt’s   restrictions   on   self-­‐observation   were   transgressed.  Oswald  Külpe,  one  of  Wundt’s  former  students,  headed  an  institute   of   experimental   psychology   in   Würzburg   that   developed   a   rather   different   experimental   practice   and   language   for   describing   the   mind.     Histories   of   the   Würzburg  School  usually  begin  in  1901  with  an  article  published  by  Mayer  and   Orth   on   some   of   the   qualitative   and   experiential   aspects   of   association.   Mayer   and   Orth   (1901)   aimed   to   classify   association   psychologically,   rather   than   logically,   as   had   previously   been   done.   To   do   so,   they   adopted   a   method,   whereby  the  observer  is  presented  with  a  word,  for  which  they  are  to  make  an   association,   and   then   retrospectively   report   on   the   process   and   mental   content   involved  in  making  it.     In   the   course   of   their   experiments,   they   claim   to   have   stumbled   upon   a   content   of   consciousness   that   did   not   fit   the   traditional   classifications   of   sensations,   feelings   and   images   (as   used   by,   for   example,   Wundt).   To   handle   this   new   content   they   invented   the   untranslatable   word   ‘bewusstseinslagen’,   which   nonetheless  has  been  variously  translated  as  ‘mental  set’,  ‘posture  or  attitude  of   consciousness’   (Titchener,   1909),   ‘state   of   consciousness’   (Humprey,   1951),   ‘disposition   of   consciousness’   (Mandler   and   Mandler,   1963),   and   ‘situation   of   consciousness’   (Kusch,   1999).     Later   that   year,   Marbe,   a   collaborator   with   Mayer   and   Orth   at   Würzburg,   published   a   monograph   on   judgment   using   a   similar   retrospective  method  and  language  of  description.    In  fact,  Marbe  restricted  his   participants’   language   of   reporting   to   the   traditional   classifications   of   mental   contents   plus   bewusstseinslagen   (Kusch,   1999).   Neither   Mayer   and   Orth’s   (1901)   nor   Marbe’s   (1901)   publication,   however,   did   much   with   the   new   concept,   beyond  identifying  it,  and  the  identification  itself  was  purely  negative,  as  not  an   image,   sensation   or   feeling.   Nevertheless,   in   giving   the   new   content   a   name,   they   created   an   open   descriptive   concept,   which   would   in   turn   trigger   a   generative   search  for  its  meaning  within  the  Würzburg  School.       The  word  bewusstseinslagen  (Bsl)  soon  encompassed  all  three  aspects  of   the   traditional   division   of   mind—i.e.,   conation,   feeling   and   cognition.     First,   against  Wundt’s  associative  psychology,  they  used  Bsl  to  conceptualize  mind  as   always   actively   engaged,   goal-­‐directed,   or   purposive.     Second,   Bsl   could   be   the   feelings,   which   accompany   the   monitoring   of   progress   toward   the   task   goal.     Third,   it   could   be   understood   cognitively   as   a   kind   of   “summary   feeling”—e.g.,   Høffding’s   feeling   of   familiarity.   Given   this   wide-­‐ranging   meaning   Bsl   quickly   became   ubiquitous   in   introspective   reports.     Consider   the   following   examples   from   Messer’s   (1905)   experiments,   in   which   observers   were   presented   with   a   stimulus   word   for   which   they   were   to,   for   example,   coordinate   a   concept   or   give   the  first  word  to  come  to  mind:     Subject   4:   “Bsl,   containing   two   thoughts:   1.   You   have   to   wait,   2.   The   coordinated   object   will   come   to   you.”   “Bsl,   for   which   I   can   give   the   thought:  that’s  easy.”  “Bsl:  There  is  a  subordinate  concept  somewhere,  but   you  can’t  formulate  it  very  easily.”   Subject   6:   “Bsl:   don’t   say   that.”   “Bsl,   my   father   always   used   to   mispronounce  that  name.”  “Bsl;  you  could  say  that  at  anytime.”   Subject  3:  “Bsl:  Why  not  think  about  something  else!”                  (Quoted  from  Mandler,  2007,  p.  82)     Others  in  the  Würzburg  invented  concepts  akin  to  Bsl  that  either  supplemented   or  subsumed  it.    For  example,  Ach  (1905)  developed  the  even  broader  concept  of   ‘awareness’   (Bewusstheit)   to   point   to   our   ‘immediate   knowledge’   of   a   situation,   intention,  meaning  or  action.    Messer  (1906)  and  Bühler  (1907)  went  further  by   relabeling   Bsl   as   ‘thought’   (Gedanke).   Bühler   is   particularly   interesting   for   our   purposes  because  he  not  only  reformed  the  theoretical  language  of  the  Würzburg   School   but   also   encouraged   the   free   use   of   language   by   the   participants   in   his   experiments.     According   to   him,   experimental   procedures   should   be   brought   closer   to   everyday   life   by   doing   away   with   complex   laboratory   equipment   and   re-­‐conceiving   the   relation   between   experimenter   and   research   participant   as   a   naturalistic  conversation,  where  there  were  no  restrictions  on  the  possible  uses   of   language   to   describe   one’s   experience.   This   was   the   exact   opposite   of   Wundt’s   method  and  it  is  little  surprise  that  Wundt  was  one  of  the  most  vehement  critics.   We  will  return  to  this  issue  in  the  next  section.       Expressions  similar  to  Bsl  also  came  to  be  used  outside  of  Würzburg.    The   English   psychologist   Frederic   Bartlett,   for   example,   uses   the   word   ‘attitude’   to   name   “a   complex   psychological   state   or   process   which   is   hard   to   describe   in   more  elementary  terms”  adding  that  “it  is,  however,  (...)  very  largely  a  matter  of   feeling,  or  affect”  (Bartlett,  1932,  pp.  206-­‐207).    Bartlett  explicitly  points  out  the   similarity   between   his   concept   of   ‘attitude’   and   Würzburg   psychologist   Betz’s   (1910)  concept  of  Einstellung  (Bartlett,  1916).    Although  Bartlett  did  not  use  his   participants’   self-­‐observations   as   his   primary   data   of   analysis,   he   did   carefully   attend   to   them   in   reconstructing   the   process   by   which   the   primary   data   (e.g.,   story   reconstructions)   was   produced.     In   this   way,   Bartlett   fits   his   participants’   reports  (which  like  Bühler’s  experiments  were  expressed  in  everyday  language)   into  his  own  theoretical  language,  and  in  so  doing  lumps  together  a  diverse  range   of   expressions,   which   at   first   glance   do   not   seem   to   have   much   to   do   with   one   another—for   example,   “hesitation”,   “surprise”,   “confidence”,   “repulsion”,   “exciting”,   “adventurous”,   “like   I   read   as   a   child”,   and   “not   English”.           In  summary,  we  see  that  open  descriptive  concepts  can  be  both  enabling   and   constraining.   Coining   the   word   Bsl   guided   the   Würzburg   to   aspects   of   our   experience   previously   unattended   to   by   psychologists   and   philosophers.     In   so   doing,   they   set   up   a   new   space   of   exploration   and   development.     This   space   should  not  be  thought  of  as  simply  an  arena  waiting  to  be  discovered  but  rather   one   that   only   becomes   meaningful   within   social   framework   or   institution.     Psychological   phenomena   are   not   natural   kinds   like   electrons;   they   are   human   kinds,  which  presuppose  a  background  of  intelligibility  in  social  practices.    Even   more,   human   kinds   unlike   natural   kinds   have   the   potential   to   feedback   into   human   practices   and   transform   them   (Hacking,   1995).     Thus,   our   folk   conceptions   of   thought,   emotion   and   memory   guide   the   way   we   think,   feel   and   remember.     In   this   way,   new   psychological   concepts   open   doors   to   certain   research  practices  while  at  the  same  time  closing  others.    Bsl  was  productive  in   that  it  set  in  motion  a  novel  program  of  research  on  thinking,  using  an  innovative   new  methodology.  This  is  not  to  say  that  Würzburg  were  unconstrained  in  their   use   of   language.   Though   Würzburg   vocabulary   was   more   permissive   than   Wundt’s  laboratory  there  was  still  definite  institutional   constraint  on  what  and   how  an  experience  could  be  reported.         Holistic  psychology  and  the  poetics  of  description       Unsurprisingly,  there  was  a  heated  debate  between  positions  adopted  by   Wundt   and   the   Würzburgers   over   the   contents   of   consciousness   and   the   appropriate   methods   for   studying   psychological   phenomena.   Titchener,   a   student   of   Wundt,   adopted   Würzburg   like   methods   (i.e.   ‘systematic   introspection’)  to  produce  evidence  for  Wundt’s  position  that  imageless  thought   did   not   occur.   Danziger   eloquently   describes   how   this   debate   transformed   into   one  about  the  use  of  language  for  reporting  experience:         The   question   of   the   validity   of   systematic   introspection   reports   […]   becomes  a  question  of  the  relation  between  the  relationship  between  the   subjective   experiences   that   form   the   ultimate   data   and   the   verbal   form   in   which   they   are   symbolically   expressed.     This   relationship,   however,   can   take   different   forms,   just   as   a   physical   datum   can   be   symbolically   represented   by   a   drawing   or   by   verbal   description.     One   might   describe   the   distinguishing   parts   of   the   original   experience,   but   then   one   would   inevitably   fail   to   communicate   the   nature   of   the   experience   as   a   whole;   alternatively,   one   might   attempt   to   convey   the   quality   of   the   whole   experience,   but   this   would   usually   have   to   be   done   metaphorically,   and   therefore   ambiguously,   providing   no   certainty   that   the   experimenter’s   interpretation   corresponded   to   what   had   actually   been   in   the   subject’s   mind.     While   a   relatively   unambiguous   description   of   elements   of   experience  in  a  sensationalistic  language  is  possible,  it  is  also  irrelevant,   for  it  simply  does  not  give  an  account  of  the  experience  as  it  existed.    On   the  other  hand,  verbal  messages  about  actual  whole  experiences  have  an   expressive,   so   to   say   poetic,   quality   which   is   effective   for   purposes   of   interpersonal   communication,   but   which   allows   no   scientifically   certain   conclusions   to   be   drawn   about   the   precise   equivalence   of   what   the   message   evokes   in   the   mind   of   the   listener   and   what   went   on   in   the   mind   of  the  reporter.                   (Danziger,  1980,  pp.  255-­‐256)     In   this   section,   I   will   explore   the   dynamics   of   holistic   and   metaphorical   language  in  describing  ones  experience.  After  the  waning  of  the  Würzburg  School   in  Germany,  we  find  the  development  of  different  kinds  of  holistic  vocabularies   in   Berlin   and   Leipzig.     In   Berlin,   Gestaltstheorie   developed   a   phenomenological   ‘form’   vocabulary,   while   in   Leipzig   Ganzheitspsychologie   advanced   a   more   metaphorical  language.  These  are  differences  between  both  their  theoretical  and   methodological   orientations.   The   Gestalt   psychologists   used   physics   as   their   source   of   inspiration,  while  Ganzheit  psychologists  borrowed  more  heavily   from   aesthetics  (see  Wagoner,  2011,  for  a  review).  Both  schools  varied  some  external   stimuli   against   which   a   research   participant’s   experience   was   understood   as   in   Wundt’s   laboratory.   However,   unlike   Wundt’s   laboratory   experience   was   described  in  terms  of  wholes.    For  example,  by  varying  the  speed  in  which  two   points   appear   Wertheimer   demonstrated   the   phi-­‐phenomenon,   whereby   we   perceive   the   stationary   points   as   moving.     Ganzheit   psychologists   presented   stimuli   in   suboptimal   conditions   (e.g.,   at   a   distance,   very   small,   for   a   fraction   of   a   second,   or   at   the   periphery   of   ones   vision)   and   improved   those   conditions,   capturing   participants’   experience   at   each   step.   They   showed   how   perception   went  beyond  the  information  given,  anticipating  future  forms.         Let   us   consider   a   study   done   by   Heinz   Werner,   who   was   trained   at   Leipzig.   Werner   used   a   tachistoscope   to   flash   phrases   in   front   of   participants   at   short   intervals.   Participants   had   to   report   what   they   saw   and   their   accompanying   thoughts   and   feelings   at   each   stimulus   exposure.   The   language   they   could   use   was  quite  open  but  referred  directly  to  the  stimulus  presented  to  them.    Consider   the  following  example  of  a  participant  who  read  the  tachistoscopically  presented   phrase  “sanfter  Wind  ”  (gentle  wind):        Through  this  series  we  can  make  inferences  about  the  relationship  between  fully   articulated   meanings   of   words   (on   the   left   in   quotation   marks)   and   “spherical   cognition”  (on  the  right).    What  Werner  attempted  to  capture  with  this  method   was  exactly  the  kind  of  experience  that  eluded  precise  description—i.e.,  the  feel   of   the   word.   His   participant   describes   it   through   metaphors   (e.g.,   “heavy”   and   “warm”)   and   diffuse   semantic   fields   (e.g.,   adjective-­‐of-­‐direction).   Latter   Werner   and   in   collaboration   with   Bernie   Kaplan   developed   a   method   whereby   participants   expressed   their   experience   in   a   non-­‐verbal   medium   (i.e.,   a   line   language)  to  explore  non-­‐propositional  aspects  of  language  (Werner  and  Kaplan,   1963)  and  to  help  participant’s  articulate  their  emotions  (Kaplan,  1955).       James   and   Bergson   had   much   earlier   made   arguments   for   the   use   of   metaphorical   expressions   to   describe   one’s   experience,   though   both   thinkers   utilized   a   non-­‐experimental   method   of   self-­‐observation.   According   to   them   ordinary  language  misleads  us  into  turning  processes  into  static  things.  Bergson   (1903)   even   elevated   his   experiential   approach   to   “metaphysics”   as   such.   Through   the   ‘intuitive’   grasp   of   ones   own   consciousness   one   came   into   contact   with   the   “absolute”.   In   order   to   express   this,   however,   one   had   to   use   symbols,   which   could   only   “approximate”   what   was   apprehended   through   intuition.   Bergson’s   strategy   was   to   deploy   a   number   of   different   metaphors   to   describe   consciousness,   always   pointing   out   how   they   ultimately   failed   to   capture   the   whole.  Yet,  they  functioned  well  to  sensitize  to  certain  aspects  of  our  intuitively   apprehended  experience.  Like  Bergson,  James  marveled  in  the  amorphous  whole   of   the   mind   and   called   on   thinkers   to   develop   rich   metaphors   that   might   capture   some   aspect   of   it.   From   James   (1890)   we   have   such   poetic   expressions   for   experience   as   “the   streaming   of   consciousness”,   “the   buzzing   blooming   confusion”   and   “the   fringe   of   consciousness”,   which   the   Würzburgers   saw   as   being  akin  to  their  own  term  Bsl.    Though  it  is  difficult  to  pinpoint  what  exactly   James’  terms  refer  to,  they  are  highly  suggestive  and  have  inspired  generations   of  psychologists  and  even  stimulated  popular  culture  (with,  e.g.,  the  development   of  the  stream  of  consciousness  novel).    They  are  open  descriptive  concepts  that   allow   us   to   holistically   express   our   experience   as   well   as   guide   us   in   its   investigation.           Self-­Observation  as  a  Social  Process     From  the  above  brief  review,  we  see  that  there  is  an  intimate  relationship   between   language   and   the   character   attributed   to   experience.   I   am   not   1.   “—?   Wind.”   What   stood   before   “wind”   feels   like   an   adjective   specifying   something  similar.  Definitely  not  a  word  defining  direction.   2.   “—ter   Wind.”   Know   now   that   the   word   is   “heavier”   than   “warm”…   somehow  more  abstract.   3.  “—cher  Wind.”  Now  it  looks  more  like  an  adjective-­‐of-­‐direction.   4.  “—ter  Wind.”  Now  again  somehow  more  concrete,  it  faces  me  and  looks   somewhat  like  “weicher  Wind”  (soft  Wind),  but  “ter”  is  in  my  way.   5.  Now  very  clearly:  “sanfter  Wind.”  Not  at  all  surprised.  I  had  this  actually   before  in  the  characteristic  feel  of  the  word  and  the  looks  of  it.   (Werner,  1956,  p.  348)   suggesting  that  language  determines  experience,  but  rather  that  there  is  complex   dialectic   between   the   two.     Poets   and   artists   as   well   as   psychologists   and   philosophers   have   provided   us   with   insightful   and   novel   means   of   not   only   expressing,   but   also,   more   importantly,   observing   our   own   experience.     This   would  not  be  possible  if  experience  was  a  purely  individual  and  private  matter.     Instead,   we   live   in   an   intersubjectively   shared   and   immanently   meaningful   world.    Humans  exist  as  beings  in  constant  communication  with  others,  through   which   we   come   to   develop   shared   perspectives   on   our   experience.   This   is   precisely   why   works   of   art   and   literature   are   often   so   illuminating;   they   teach   us   both   about   the   particularities   of   our   own   life   and   about   aspects   of   the   human   condition   in   general,   which   we   do   not   usually   see   simply   because   we   are   too   close   to   them   in   our   everyday   lives.     In   this   section,   we   will   consider   what   is   involved  in  this  symbolization  of  experience  and  how  it  feeds  forward  into  future   experiencing.    My  starting  point  for  this  theoretical  discussion  is  the  functionalist   perspective   of   the   American   pragmatists,   whose   ideas   were   later   developed   by   a   number  of  innovative  psychologists.         The  American  pragmatists  put  forward  one  of  the  most  powerful  critiques   of   the   traditional   conceptualization   of   self-­‐observation,   especially   Dewey   and   Mead.     Their   critique   has   been   generally   missed   as   a   result   of   psychology’s   history  myth,  whereby  the  discipline  has  progressed  in  dialectical  fashion  from   the   ‘introspectionists’   to   ‘the   behaviorists’   and   finally   to   their   synthesis   in   ‘cognitive   psychology’   (Costall,   2006).     One   of   the   many   things   wrong   with   this   story   is   that   Watson’s   (1913)   rather   uninteresting   arguments   are   given   central   place  in  the  advancement  of  psychology,  when  in  fact  more  developed  critiques   of  self-­‐observation  were  made  long  before  him.       For   example,   Mead   (1910)   argued   that   ‘Other   selves   in   a   social   environment   logically   antedate   the   consciousness   of   self   which   introspection   analyzes’   (p.   179).     In   other   words,   the   act   of   self-­‐reflection   presupposes   social   interaction   with   others.     The   introspection   involves   the   incorporation   of   the   other   into   the   self.     This   conceptual   move   naturalizes   the   act   of   self-­‐reflection   by   showing  that  it  is  an  outgrowth  of  a  social  process.    One’s  own  gesture  does  not   initially   have   meaning   for   oneself.   A   dog   that   shows   its   teeth   or   a   cat   the   purrs   is   expressing   an   emotion   but   it   is   not   aware   of   the   meaning   their   gesture.     The   gesture   only   has   meaning   for   others,   which   is   their   response   to   the   gesture—e.g.   to  fight  or  run.    The  establishment  of  shared  meaning  requires  the  existence  of   stable  social  institutions  with  interchangeable  social  positions  (such  as  buying  or   selling,   talking   and   listening).     Because   a   vocal   gesture   can   be   heard   from   both   sides  of  a  social  act  in  a  social  practice  it  takes  on  a  dual  meaning  and  enables  the   movement   from   one   social   perspective   to   another.   I   am   other   from   the   perspective  of  another  person’s  perspective.    Thus,  by  taking  the  social  position   of  the  other,  through  the  vocal  gesture  inside  the  social  act,  I  can  become  other  to   myself   (Mead,   1934).     In   short,   introspective   self-­‐reflection   is   only   possible   through   a   history   of   interaction   with   others   in   social   institutions.     In   Mead’s   (1910,  p.  179)  own  words,     Consciousness  could  no  longer  be  approached  as  an  island  […]  It  would  be   approached   as   experience   which   is   socially   as   well   as   physically   determined.   Introspective   self-­‐consciousness   would   be   recognized   as   a   subjective  phase,  and  this  subjective  phase  could  no  longer  be  regarded  as   the  source  out  of  which  the  experience  arose.  Objective  consciousness  of   selves   must   precede   subjective   consciousness,   and   must   continually   condition  it,  if  consciousness  of  meaning  itself  presupposes  the  selves  as   there   […]   When   in   the   process   revealed   by   introspection   we   reach   the   concept  of  self,  we  have  attained  an  attitude  which  we  assume  not  toward   our   inner   feelings,   but   toward   other   individuals   whose   reality   was   implied   even   in   the   inhibitions   and   reorganizations   which   characterize   this  inner  consciousness.             Introspective  self-­‐consciousness  is  derivative  of  consciousness  of  others  and  not   vice-­‐versa.   Internal   thought   here   is   a   form   of   inner   dramatization   of   social   conduct  and  is  thus  necessarily  bound  up  with  social  meanings.       So   far   the   conditions   and   character   of   the   inner   directed   phase   of   self-­‐ observation  have  been  described.  Let  us  at  this  point  consider  the  outer  directed   communication   phase,   whereby   experience   becomes   the   data   of   scientific   analysis.   Firstly,   it   should   be   made   clear   that   though   communication   of   ones   experience   has   typically   been   done   through   the   verbal   medium   in   psychology,   we   can   take   ‘language’   in   a   broader   sense   as   any   means   of   establishing   intersubjectivity,   and   may   include,   e.g.   ‘gesture   languages’,   ‘picture   languages’   and   ‘line-­‐languages’.   For   something   to   count   language   there   must   a   differentiation  between  the  perspectives  of  an  addresser  and  addressee  as  well  as   between  the  object  and  symbolic  vehicle  used  to  refer  to  it  (Werner  and  Kaplan,   1963).     There   is   a   direct   link   to   Mead’s   (1934)   approach,   in   which   language   brings   together   two   perspectives   (i.e.,   addresser   and   addressee)   taking   place   within  a  social  act.  Objects  in  Mead’s  approach  are  also  referred  to  through  some   material   medium   (e.g.,   the   vocal   gesture),   and   thus   out   of   this   interaction   distinctly   social   objects   may   emerge,   e.g.,   property.   The   opposing   pairs   addressee-­‐addresser  and  object-­‐symbolic  vehicle  can  be  more  or  less  distanced   from  one  another.    For  example,  communication  between  two  people  with  a  long   history   together   has   a   very   different   form   to   one   between   strangers.     In   the   former   case,   much   can   be   taken   for   granted   while   the   latter   relies   more   on   widely   shared   conventions   of   communication.     In   communicating   we   always   attune  to  the  perspective  of  our  interlocutor  (of  course,  with  varying  degrees  of   success).   As   a   thought   experiment,   it   is   interesting   to   think   of   what   the   introspection   reports   would   have   looked   like   if   the   observer   was   from   one   school   of   psychology   (e.g.,   Würzburg)   and   the   experimenter   another   (e.g.,   Leipzig).    How  would  these  inter-­‐institutional  dynamics  affect  the  data  generated   there?       The  inner  directed  phase  of  self-­‐observation  involves  reflecting  on  oneself   through  the  perspective  of  others  and  a  social  institution  more  generally,  while   the  outer  directed  phase  involves  transforming  that  experience  into  a  symbolic   form   understandable   within   institutional   constraints   of   communication.   These   two  phases  are  mutually  in  feeding.    The  symbolic  products  of  an  introspective   report   can   be   used   as   orienting   devices   in   the   act   of   observing   one’s   own   experience  and  what  is  there  observed  can  find  its  way  back  into  reports  in  one   expression   or   another.     We   saw   above   how   quickly   the   ambiguous   concept   Bsl   quickly   became   ubiquitous   in   introspective   reports;   however,   the   concept   evolved   during   the   history   of   the   Würzburg   School,   which   suggests   that   the   concept   was   a   constraint   but   not   a   determinant   of   experience.     It   would   be   interesting   to   explore   how   reporting   experience   (in   say   one   medium,   such   as   drawing   versus   verbal)   affected   what   was   reported   in   future   trails.     In   one   experiment  on  imagination,  Bartlett  (1932)  presented  participants  with  a  series   of   inkblots   and   asked   them   to   provide   a   description   of   each.     He   reports   a   “persistence   of   attitude”   in   participants’   interpretations   –   for   example,   one   participant   sees   “ghosts”;   “more   ghosts   kissing”;   “more   kissing”;   “green   ghosts”   (Bartlett,   1916,   p.   255).     Thus,   what   is   reported   in   the   first   instance   becomes   a   constraint  on  what  is  observed  thereafter.           Experience   comes   into   being   and   is   formed   through   some   material   medium.  Thus,  the  strict  separation  between  inner  and  outer  is  unjustified.    The   boundary  between  the  two  is  mutable.    At  times  observation  of  ones  experience   and  communicate  of  it  may  even  coincide,  as  when  we  think  aloud.  Ericsson  and   Simon   (1993)   have   done   a   number   of   ingenious   studies   on   expertise,   in   which   they   simply   have   participants   say   aloud   what   they   normal   say   silently   to   themselves.    With  this  method  they  can  show,  for  example,  the  strategies  waiters   use  to  organize  their  memory  for  orders.    In  the  next  section,  I  will  explore  how   we   can   transform   rating   scales   into   a   method   sensitive   to   the   above   outlined   social  dynamics  of  self-­‐observation.           Rethinking  Ratings  Scales:  Triggering  a  Process  of  Sense  Making       Rating   scales   are   one   of   the   most   widely   used   research   methods   in   contemporary   psychology.   They   provide   a   quick   means   of   obtaining   large   quantities  of  data  that  can  then  be  interpreted  through  a  statistical  analysis.    This   data,  however,  is  much  more  problematic  than  researchers  are  typically  willing   to  recognize.  For  rating  scales  to  be  valid,  we  must  assume  that  in  making  a  mark   on   a   scale   we   are   immediately,   unitarily,   and   accurately   accessing   our   mental   states,   and   that   these   states   are   inherently   quantifiable—all   very   controversial   assumptions     (Wagoner   and   Valsiner,   2005;   see   also   below).     Simply   labeling   them   ‘self-­‐report’   methods   rather   than   ‘self-­‐observation’   or   ‘introspective’   methods  or  attending  to  quantitative  outcomes  overcome  of  these  process  does   not  overcome  the  difficulties  involved  in  the  practice  of  self-­‐observation,  though   it   might   obscure   them   in   the   eyes   of   the   research   community.   One   could   without   too  much  difficulty  argue  that  contemporary  versions  of  self-­‐observation,  such  as   rating   scales,   are   in   fact   much   more   primitive   than   those   practiced   in   the   first   decades  of  the  20th  century:  By  using  naïve  observers,  who  have  only  a  minimal   social  relation  to  the  experimenter,  and  by  only  attending  to  static  outcomes  the   data  generated  by  rating  scales,  the  data  produced  is  much  more  ambiguous  than   in  early  introspective  methods.     In   this   section,   I   will   draw   on   a   study   I   conducted   with   Jaan   Valsiner   (Wagoner  and  Valsiner,  2005)  to  disambiguate  rating  scale  data  by  focusing  on   the  process  by  which  the  data  is  produced  rather  than  the  quantitative  outcome   of  this  process.    Rating  scales  normally  encourage  research  participants  to  speed   up   the   process   of   rating   with   endless   pages   of   a   boring   questionnaire,   which   participants  try  to  get  through  as  quickly  as  possible.    Our  method,  by  contrast,   was  a  process-­‐oriented  approach.    To  observe  it  we  slowed  down  the  process  of   rating  and  focused  our  analysis  on  the  dynamics  therein.  In  our  study  observers   were  presented  with  a  picture  of  an  attractive  member  of  the  opposite  sex,  which   they   were   to   rate   on   multiple   dimensions   –e.g.,   attractiveness,   approachable,   likeable,   etc.     In   the   questionnaire,   participants   were   first   to   make   their   rating   and  then  immediately  explain  how  they  arrived  at  the  mark  in  a  space  provided   directly   below   the   scale.     Thus,   the   research   strategy   was   similar   to   that   of   the   Würzburg  School.       Consider  the  following  female’s  rating  for  “approachable”  (ibid,  p.  203)  –   the  arrows  and  divisions  are  made  by  the  researchers  to  help  the  reader  attend   to  certain  aspects  of  the  participant’s  text:                                    Approachable                        Not  at  all              |-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐X-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|   Very  much                                              ←←←←←<Object>→→→→→     In  the  inquiry  into  the  subject’s  rationale  of  putting  the  marker  in  the  middle,  we   get:     “Personally  approaching  guys   especially  nice  looking  guys  is   not   a   common   practice   so   I   wouldn’t   deem   him   all   that   approachable…   …but  he  would  probably  be   used   to   girls   approaching   him…                                     …so  it  evens  out.”       We  see  that  making  a  rating  does  not  involve  an  immediate  or  unitary  access  to   some   internal   mental   state.     Instead,   an   elaborated   process   of   sense   making   is   involved.    The  participant  relates  to  the  object  of  rating  (i.e.  the  picture  of  a  man)   through   the   linguistic   category   of   ‘approachable’.     The   category   does   not   directly   map   onto   some   hypothetical   internal   state,   but   is   rather   an   internally   negotiated   intersubjective  relation.  In  other  words,  ‘approachable’  can  only  be  made  sense   of  in  a  co-­‐inhabited  and  immanently  meaningful  world.    Although  the  subject  is   engaged  in  what  might  be  called  an  ‘internal’  process,  the  process  itself  involves   imagining   public   scenarios   that   would   count   as   ‘approachable’   within   ordinary   language.    In  so  doing,  she  identifies  two  rather  different  and  opposing  scenarios:   in   the   first,   she   imagines   herself   approaching   a   nice   looking   guy,   while   the   second  is  a  more  abstract  use  of  ‘approachable’  as  a  category  to  describe  the  man   on   his   own   terms,   taking   herself   out   of   the   picture.     Both   meanings   of   ‘approachable’   are   grammatically   correct   (to   use   Wittgenstein’s   phrase)   in   ordinary  language.       This  ambiguity  in  the  meaning  of  ‘approachable’  as  this  participant  relates   to   the   picture   generates   a   dialogical   tension   (represented   by   the   <object>   with   arrows  to  the  left  and  right  of  it),  which  traditional  rating  scales  that  only  look  at   the  quantitative  outcome  would  be  entirely  blind  to.  They  would  assume  a  rating   in  the  middle  of  the  scale  is  the  outcome  of  a  neutral  response.    However,  here   we  see  that  in  fact  it  represents  two  forces  pulling  in  opposite  directions.    It  is  the   interplay  between  these  two  parts  (phases)  that  produces  the  “3”,  rather  than  a   single   state.     In   focusing   on   the   process   of   constructing   an   intersubjectively   meaningful   rating   over   the   outcome   we   come   to   see   that   a   multiplicity   of   meanings  and  forces  are  at  work  for  a  single  unitary  rating.    In  short,  by  slowing   down  the  process  and  by  building  in  space  for  meaningful  elaboration  in  order  to   access  these  constructive  dynamics  of  rating,  we  see  that  there  is  much  more  to   rating   than   is   normally   assumed.   Let   us   take   another   example   to   further   illustrate  this  point:                 Courteous                        Not  at  all              |-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐X-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|   Very  much                                                                ←←←←<Object>→→→→→     In   the   inquiry   into   the   subject’s   rationale   of   putting   the   mark   just   right   of   the   middle,  we  get:     “I   can   see   this   guy   holding   doors   for   the   ladies   and   buying   flowers   for   his   girl,   etc.  which  is  courteous/nice…     …but  I  can  see  him  having  multiple  girls.”         Again,   there   is   striving   to   situate   the   category   and   object   of   rating   to   intersubjectively  meaningful  world,  leading  the  subject  to  imagine  two  opposing   scenarios,  both  of  which  are  grammatically  correct  uses  of  ‘courteous’.    As  above,   the   switch   of   perspectives   is   easily   identifiable   with   the   use   of   the   word   ‘but’.     Interestingly,   although   the   two   uses   of   ‘courteous’   are   conflicting   when   viewed   from  a  meta-­‐level  (as  we  force  participants  to  do  with  the  rating  task),  they  co-­‐ exist  without  confusion  in  everyday  life,  and  as  we  see  here  they  can  easily  flow   into  each  other  in  thought.    Of  course,  the  researcher  can  try  to  fixate  language   but   he   or   she   cannot   fix   observers’   sense   making.     Rigorously   designed   rating   scales  will  include  a  test  phase  to  minimize  the  problem  of  the  openness  of  word   meaning,   rewording   their   questions   accordingly.     However,   language   is   inherently  open  and  ambiguous.    Words  do  not  fit  things  in  a  one-­‐to-­‐one  relation.     Therefore,  researcher’s  efforts  to  fix  the  meaning  of  words  and  their  relation  to   judgments  can  only  ever  by  partial.    Instead  of  hiding  these  complexities  behind   quantitative  scores  and  aggregate  statistics,  methods  of  self-­‐observation  need  to   bring   them   to   the   fore   if   they   are   to   count   as   rigorous   scientific   methods.     Otherwise,  the  meaning  of  the  numbers  on  a  scale  will  remain  entirely  obscure.     Moreover,   ignoring   the   question   of   participants’   meaning   allows   researchers   to   talk   as   if   a   certain   experimental   manipulation   caused   participants   to   think   in   a   certain   way   (as   indicated   by   a   rating   scale   score).     The   above   examples   illustrate   that   participants   enter   a   space   of   reasons   or   norms   when   they   fill   out   a   rating   scale.     Thus,   the   category   of   cause   is   inappropriate   here;   instead,   participants   negotiate   meaning.   As   such   we   need   to   adopt   a   discourse   of   mediation   in   the   place  of  causality  (see  e.g.,  Moghaddam,  2006).           Conclusion       In  this  chapter,  I  have  argued  that  the  practice  of  self-­‐observation  should   be  developed  along  functionalist  lines  of  thought  rather  than  in  dualistic  terms.     Using  early  debates  about  in  self-­‐observation  as  our  case  study,  we  saw  that  the   data  produced  was  intertwined  with  the  institutions  (with  their  varied  practices,   social  roles  and  languages)  within  which  it  occurs.    An  expression  of  experience   is  a  social  relation  because  1)  it  is  made  possible  by  being  a  co-­‐inhabitant  of  an   inter-­‐subjectively   shared   world   and   2)   it   carries   with   it   the   potential   to   attune   others  to  some  aspect  of  human  experience.    In  the  remaining  space,  I  will  sum   up  some  of  the  key  take-­‐away  points  of  this  chapter:     1) One  gets  different  results  on  the  two-­‐point  test  depending  on  the  degree   of  permissiveness  in  language  used  to  report  the  scores  and  more  broadly   the  institution  in  which  the  reporting  occurs.    Thus,  there  were  differing   results  between  laboratories  in  Leipzig,  Paris  and  Torres  Straight.       2) Open  descriptive  concepts  (such  as   Bsl  or  the  ‘stream  of  consciousness’)   can   be   generative   of   productive   new   research   directions.     This   points   to   the   fact   that   psychological   concepts   are   not   natural   kinds   but   rather   human   kinds,   which   once   created   feedback   into   social   practices   and   experience.       3) Debates   over   self-­‐observation   turned   into   discussions 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